HUNTINGTON'UN SIVIL KONTROL KAVRAMI VE TEMMUZ 2016 DARBE GIRIŞIMI SONRASI TÜRKIYE'DE YAPILAN REFORMLARIN DEĞERLENDIRILMESI

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DOI : 10.29228/SOBIDER.63646
Year-Number: 2022-59
Yayımlanma Tarihi: 2022-09-03 21:55:13.0
Language : İngilizce
Konu : Siyaset Bilimi
Number of pages: 236-252
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Abstract

One of the issues discussed in the analysis of politics is the civil-military relationship. In many countries, the army, as a social class, can influence politics with the opportunities it has. When political realities and military ideals clash with each other, it is seen that this relationship turns into chaos. Therefore, controlling civil-military relations requires civil authorities to deal with many problems effectively. The concept of “objective civilian control” introduced by Samuel Huntington refers to a specific situation in which the authority of the army is limited in favor of civilians, the army is accountable to civilians, and the decisive role of civilians in public decision-making is strengthened. Turkey, which has a significant experience in civil-military relations, has undergone an important transformation in which civilian control is ensured with many constitutional and institutional changes. However, experience has shown that the 15 July coup attempt maintains the importance of civil-military relations in Turkey and military coups still pose a threat to the country. The study aims to discuss whether the new political situation established in Turkey after the coup attempt in July 2016 overlaps with Huntington's definition of “objective civilian control”.

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Abstract

Siyasetle ilgili yapılan çözümlemelerde tartışılan konulardan biri de sivil-asker ilişkisidir. Birçok ülkede, toplumsal bir sınıf olarak ordu, sahip olduğu imkânlarla siyaseti etkileyebilmektedir. Politik gerçeklerle askeri ideallerin birbiriyle çatışması durumunda ise bu ilişkinin bir kaosa dönüştüğü görülmektedir. O nedenle sivil-asker ilişkilerinin kontrol edilmesi, sivil otoritelerin birçok sorunu etkin bir şekilde ele almasını gerektirmektedir. Samuel Huntinton tarafından ortaya konan “ nesnel sivil kontrol” kavramı  ordunun otoritesinin siviller lehine sınırlandığı, ordunun sivillere karşı sorumlu olduğu ve kamusal karar alma mekanizmalarında sivillerin belirleyici rolünün güçlendirildiği belirli bir durumu ifade etmektedir. Sivil-asker ilişkileri konusunda önemli bir tecrübeye sahip olan Türkiye, yapılan birçok anayasal ve kurumsal değişiklikle birlikte sivil kontrolün temin edildiği önemli bir dönüşüm yaşamıştır. Ancak tecrübe 15 Temmuz hadisesi, Türkiye’de sivil asker ilişkileri konusunun önemini koruduğunu ve askeri darbelerin ülke için hâlâ tehdit oluşturduğunu göstermiştir. Çalışma, Temmuz 2016'daki darbe girişiminin ardından Türkiye'de kurulan yeni siyasi durumun, Huntington'ın “nesnel sivil kontrol” tanımıyla örtüşüp örtüşmediğini tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır.

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Kaynakça

  • Finer, whose “Man on Horseback” is one of the classics of civilian-military relations literature,questions why the military does not intervene more frequently given its superior armed power.He claims that military respect to civilian supremacy is the leading factor for preventinginterventions (Finer, 1975: 5). Finer suggested that the key to good civil-military relations wasthe army showing respect to the principle of the supremacy of civilian authority (Avant, 1998: 377).
  • Samuel Huntington is another leading scholar in the field of civil-military relations. In hisseminal work “The Soldier and the State” he proposed original ideas which are still widelydiscussed in the academia. Huntington believed that separation of civilian and military areas isthe fundamental principle of healthy relations between the two spheres. On one hand, statesmenaccept the ideas of military expertise and integrity of areas of interest; on the other hand, theofficer remains politically impartial and accepts political leadership pf statesmen. Huntingtonsuggests that changes in civil-military relations occur when this balance is lost (Huntington, 1959: 70-72).
  • Huntington defended that a certain type of civilian control should maximize both thesubordination of soldiers to civilian authority and the military power of the armed forces; hecalled it “objective civilian control”. This type of control guarantees that the civilians areprotected both from the enemy outside and the military itself (Feaver, 1996: 160). Huntingtonclaimed that objective civilian control consists of the acceptance and recognition of (i) an areaof expertise and autonomy for the military by civilian leaders, and (ii) minimization of political intervention in the armed forces (Huntington, 1996: 9).
  • Huntington believed that the major problem in civilian-military relations was not the possibilityof a coup d’etat; it was whether the military which reflects societal values best is the militarywhich is most capable of defending national interests. This is the result of a conflict betweenliberal societal values and traditional functions of the military (Avant, 1998: 377). He discussedthat objective civilian control, which is a hallmark of industrialized democracies, had 4 basic premises:
  • 4. As a result, minimization of political intervention in the military and military intervention in politics (Huntington, 1996: 9-10).
  • The opposite of this model lays the “subjective civilian control” concept. This concept hasbeen developed by constitutional formations and government agencies which combine politicaland military responsibilities and distribute the control of military affairs to multiple politicalbodies. On the other hand, objective civilian control is developed by a configuration and bodyof agencies which separate political and military responsibilities and give the control of military affairs to a single legal authority (Huntington, 1956: 678).
  • century. Subjective civilian control reaches its goal byincreasing civilian interference in the armed forces and making it a “reflection” of the politicalsphere. Objective civilian control is, on the contrary, related to militarizing the armed forces andmaking it an instrument of the government. Therefore, subjective civilian control envisages thatthe armed forces take a step in politics, whereas objective civilian control requires that the armyis separated from it (Huntington, 1956: 678). In subjective civilian control, organizationalautonomy of the professional army is devastated. The officer fights as he/she is deprived ofproposing an alternative (Janowitz, 1957: 11). Due to the autonomy of the armed forces in itsrealm, objective civilian control requires that the officer remains within decision-makingprocesses in such matters as warfare; thus, it is not left outside this mechanism. As such,expelling the opinions of the military in such matters would harm military professionalization and, thus, civilian control.
  • In summary, the essence of objective civilian control is acceptance of autonomous militaryprofessionalization, whereas subjective civilian control rests on the refusal of an autonomous military sphere (Herspring, 1999: 560).
  • According to Huntington’s chain of causality,autonomy leads to professionalization, which leads to political impartiality and voluntarysubordination, and finally, to ensuring civilian control. In the center of this concept lies thehypothetical connection between professionalization and voluntary subordination (Feaver, 1996:160). Huntington argues that the armies of European states which reached high levels ofprofessionalism – meaning expertise, responsibility and entity – developed the tradition of notdealing with politics (Huntington, 1959: 71; Hale, 2013: 265). This means that as the membersof military bureaucracy specialize in their field, the army becomes more professional and themilitary moves away from politics towards defense-related issues, which in turn reduces itstendency to interfere with politics. As a result, officers voluntary obey their civilian superiors which consolidates civilian control.
  • Another important factor which facilitates professionalization is changes in technology, whichwas emphasized by Janowitz (1957: 13). Diversification and specialization in militarytechnology means that the official education needed to have a command in those technologiesshould take longer, which will reduce the importance of a military consisting of conscript ordinary citizens and make a completely professional military a vital necessity.
  • According to Huntington, professionalization is the key to objective civilian control. The mostimportant control mechanism is recognition of an autonomous military professionalization,which means respect for independent military movement area. Interference in military issuesdamages military professionalization and, thus, objective control. In reality, objective control isa mechanism which reduces not the military but political power of the armed forces (Feaver,1996: 160). Why does the military, given its armed strength, refrain from interfering in politics?It may well be that when they obey rules, this is because direction of armed forces by civiliansand military professional concerns are recognized within tolerable boundaries, and becausethese boundaries and exceptions are mostly reflected in the political actions taken by thegovernment (Bland, 1999: 17). Military leaders obey the government authority not because theybelieve in their aims but because fighting is their duty and profession. Professional ethics anddemocratic parliamentary bodies are guarantees of civilian political supremacy (Janowitz, 1957:10-11). The control system indicated here is one which cannot be created with laws and rules.The key to military professionalism is civilians avoiding politicization of the officer corps(Avant, 1998: 78). This is where the importance of the democratic culture of a country rises to the surface. In addition, the characteristics of civilian leadership has a critical role to play.
  • As democracies are based on the government by the people, democratic control of thebureaucracy requires intervention on the side of the citizen. In abstract terms, democracy is atype of government which is based on the will of the people but which does not necessarily produce effectiveness and efficiency (Dahl, 1961).
  • On the other hand, most moderndemocracies also have effective bureaucracies. Suleiman (2003) argues that effective policy-making is a source of legitimacy for the government. On the other hand, it is claimed that onlybureaucracy can create the efficiency required to absorb huge operation costs of a democracy(Meier and O’Toole, 2006:1). Then, one of the most important issues of societies which giveimportance to democratic procedures is ensuring that they operate effectively without turninginto institutions which are not subject to popular control and responsible towards people(Romzek and Hendricks, 1982:75). Elected officials do not have time nor do they have theexpertise required for making technical decisions. Instead, they transfer their authorities tobureaucrats so as to gain efficiency and benefit from the professional competencies that mostbureaucrats enjoy. These bureaucrats are mostly recruited through competitive exams, promoted based on the judgements of other bureaucrats, and dismissed only in extreme cases.
  • This is where Gruber (1987:3) asks the following: then, how will ordinary citizens control thework of these bureaucrats? In strong government bureaucracies, how can the development ofdecision-making authority, which is an essential element of administrative capacity, bereconciled with democracy and democratic (popular) control? On the other hand, with itsexpertise and far-reaching initiative power, what it the guarantee that bureaucracy will servegeneral interest? In the public sector, knowledge means power and is fed by uncertainty. Thepurpose of public agencies is realizing general interest, and profitability cannot be a legitimatepurpose; but this does not mean that bureaucrats do not obtain any personal benefits.Bureaucrats can attempt to turn their technical supremacy and power of knowledge into money.How can the need for bureaucracy be reconciled with democratic values? The challenge herecontinues to be one of the most important problems of public life today. Critics of the dynamicsof policy-making processes argue that decision-making should be an exclusive right of theelected politicians, not bureaucrats. Scholars such as Mosher, Downs, Niskanen and Wilsonargue that bureaucracy and bureaucrats “suffocate” democracy; they believe that bureaucratsshould have less influence and the state should be minimized. This is the only way to maximize the interests of the people (Farazmand, 2010: 249).
  • Civilian Control of the Military in Turkey in 2000s
  • Turkey took some important steps in the establishment of civilian control over the military in2000s. The electronic memorandum which was broadcasted on 27 April 2007 and the partyclosure case opened at the Constitutional Court urged the government to take measures againstthe tutelage of higher judicial bodies and the military bureaucracy. The 2010 constitutional amendments
  • In the decade thatfollowed, various reforms were put into implementation concerning human rights and rule oflaw in the form of constitutional amendments or other legislations. One of the most importantsteps taken in the context of civilization and the elimination of military tutelage was theabolishment of state of emergency which was announced for certain reasons, allowed for partialor complete suspension of basic rights and freedoms on a temporary basis, and imposition offiscal, property and labor-related liabilities on citizens during when the military had certainauthorities and, as a result, by-passed civilian authority. The state of emergency was launched in1987 temporarily due to the terrorist attacks that emerged in 1980s in the eastern andsoutheastern provinces of Turkey and was extended for 46 times; after being lifted gradually in certain provinces, it was totally abolished on 30 November 2002.
  • Another important step is related to State Security Courts (DGMs) which was included in thejudicial system with 1973 constitutional amendments as an indicator of the preeminence givento security against freedom in the balance between the two concepts. For the first time in 1999,the practice of having a military judge on court was abolished with a constitutional amendment;vfive years later these courts were totally abolished and replaced by “high criminal courts withspecial authorities” which heard the lawsuits especially about organized crimes committedagainst national security. Due to the problems experienced in ten years, the practice of “courtswith special authorities” was terminated with the third judicial package which was adopted in July 2012.
  • Another amendment was related to the structure of National Security Council (MGK), which isone of the most important institutions of political tutelage in Turkey. It entered the constitutionin 1961 and had been strengthened vis-à-vis civilian governments since then. The seventhharmonization package which passed in July 2003 reformed the secretariat general of MGK and the effect of the military was vitiated by amending the 118
  • article of the constitutiondid not create serious changes in the actual situation in civil-military balance. The increase ofcivilian members of NSC did not affect the nature of decisions which are more based on partiesand balances than voting and the influence of the military members on political decisionsremained largely unchanged (Bayramoğlu, 2007: 107). Another amendment visage that thesecretary general of NSC could be chosen among civilians so that the de facto dependency ofthe secretariat general on the military could be eliminated and the assignment conditions ofsecretary general of NSC could change. In the former version the assignment practice ofsecretary general which was based on the selection and approval by Chief of Staff was given itsfinal version and the authority was left to the approval of the president upon recommendation of the Prime Minister (Kardaş, 2006: 302-303)
  • . The second step is represented by the increase ofthe power of civilian members with the amendment made in 2003. In a similar vein, thefrequency of board meetings was reduced from once a month to once in two months and the authority of MGK in the determination of the agenda was weakened. The 4
  • The abolishment of such executive authorities of MGK as preparing national plans andprograms, continuously monitoring and evaluating the political, social, economic, cultural andtechnological situation and developments of the country, determining the basic principles whichwould serve as reference in this topic, uniting the society in line with Atatürkist thinking,Atatürk principles and revolutions and around national ideals and values and determining themeasures required for directing the society towards national objectives was a critical step(Bayramoğlu, 2007: 110). Following these amendments, the authorities of MGK were limitedwith the determination, identification and application of the national security policy of the state and the council adopted the outlook of an advisory body.
  • the topic was handled once again on constitutional level in 2010.
  • Another step was the abolishment of EMASYA protocol which was signed between Ministry ofInterior and Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1997 parallel to the increase of the authority of the militarywithin the system. This protocol allowed the military to intervene in social events in the citieswhen necessary and without the invitation of the governor. This legislation which gave directauthorities to the military in order to prevent incidents in civilian life and caused intensivedebates was abolished with the agreement reached between ministry of the interior and joint chiefs of staff in February 2010 and this negative heritage of 28 February
  • Likewise, important steps were taken to abolish the seats of the military in some of thegovernment bodies. First of all, the amendment in the constitution in May 2004 terminated theelection by Joint Chiefs of Staff of a member to the Higher Education Board and Law of HigherEducation was amended in a similar vein to cancel the article which envisaged the election of amember by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 149). Secondly, the law on thefoundation and broadcasts of radio and television channels was amended to cancel theapplication of nominating a member to the Higher Board of Radio and Television by secretariatgeneral of MGK. The same amendment also abolished the membership of secretariat general of MGK at Higher Board of Communication.
  • Another amendment was made on the judicial oversight of Higher Military Council decisionswith the 2010 constitutional amendment. In the previous form, all decisions of Higher MilitaryCouncil were exempted from judicial oversight. The 2010 constitutional amendment subjectedall dismissal decisions other than promotion measures of the council and retiring due to lack of relevant cadres to judicial oversight (1982 constitution article 125).
  • provisional articleof the constitution with 2010 constitutional amendments. The abolished provision prevented thetrial of National Security Council members who had conducted the 12 September 1980 military coup. A similar article was also found in the 4
  • provisional article of 1961 constitution of theNational Unity Council members who had conducted the 27 May 1960 military coup. The abolishment of the 15
  • provisional article 30 years after the 1980 military coup was animportant step in symbolic terms; it is also an essential acquisition in terms of the removal ofthe justification of the military coup and erasing the marks of the praetorian structure. As aresult of this step, the National Security Council members who were still alive were put on trialwithin the 12 September investigation which is very important in terms of the Turkish politics facing itself.
  • article of the constitution, but to the ministry of defense. This was seen as partof a general initiative aiming at strengthening the civilian control of the Ministry on armedforces and transform it into a body which goes beyond supporting the armed forces logisticallyand prepares defense plans. However, the military objected to this suggestion as it would lead tothe politicization of defense management and the government did not insist on the change (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 149).
  • , 2016, the military faction of Fethullahist Terrorist Organization (FETO)manifested itself as a junta construct and the country faced once again the reality that militarycoups continued to be relevant. In the aftermath of the attempted coup, state of emergency wasdeclared upon the recommendation of MGK which was designed as an exit guarantee and thegovernment obtained the authority to take some radical measures with Decree Laws and seriousregulations were imposed to eliminate the pro-junta fractions. These decree laws made essentialchanges in the structure of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). Within this context, the following measures were taken:
  • On 12 December 2016, the law on constitutional amendments on whichthe governing AK Party and Nationalist Action Party agreed was adopted by the parliament and presented to referendum.
  • The voting took place on 16 April 2017 and the constitutionalamendment was accepted. The justification of the constitutional amendment package read thatthe 1961 and 1982 constitutions were each social engineering projects based on an elitistunderstanding, and explained that constitutions were built on lack of confidence for the nation,national will and elected government emphasizing the “tutelage” system which controllednational will. It was underlined that on 15 July 2016 this understanding which could not acceptthe government based on popular will emerged in disguise and that the demand for change was a requirement of democracy and law.
  • On 24 June 2018, President Erdoğan won the elections by receiving 52% of the votes and beganto issue presidential decrees. Some of these decrees which shaped the structure of the state werecontinuation of the steps taken to reinforce control over military after 15 July coup attempt. Themembership structure of Supreme Military Council was amended once more to include vicepresidents, minister of justice, minister of foreign affairs, minister of the interior, minister of thetreasury and finance, minister of education, minister of national defense, chief of general staffand commanders-in-chief. The tasks of the council would be identification and revision of themilitary strategic concept, providing opinion on the main program and objectives of armedforces, examining and interpreting the legislation drafts related to armed forces, providingopinion on any matter whenever requested by the president, and performing other tasks given bylegislation. YAŞ would assemble at least once a year upon the call of vice president. Whenever he/she deems necessary, the president can chair YAŞ meetings.
  • Another presidential decree regulated the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Service Commands andplaced them under the ministry of national defense. According to the newly introduced article,the president can request direct reporting from chief of general staff and force commanders aswell as their subordinates. He/she can also give direct orders to the foregoing. The order is to beperformed without seeking approval from any other authority. As a result, chief of general staffand force commanders are separately subordinate and responsible to the minister of nationaldefense. However, the assignment of the former chief of general staff as the minister of defense in 2018 does not coincide with the principles of objective civilian control.
  • Another presidential decree increased the responsibilities of State Supervision Institution (SSI).According to the presidential decree no.5 which was issued on 15 July 2018, SSI is nowauthorized to audit the accounts of Joint Chiefs of Staff, service commands, National DefenseUniversity and all kinds of military schools and units as well as the Foundation forStrengthening Turkish Armed Forces and Defense Industry Support Fund, which were previously exempted from auditing activities.
  • The European Union accession process played an important role in the democratization ofTurkish political system. In this process Turkey took critical steps in the elimination of exitguarantees which were the main elements that led to the formation of military tutelage andcleared the way for civilian politics. However, these serious steps are not adequate for Turkey toenjoy a democracy at Western standards. Turkey did not finalize the structural reforms that itinitiated in EU adaptation process. This is partly due to the fact that elimination of theauthorities of the military are not more important than the functioning of the principles and rulesrequired for a democratic order and wide acceptance of democratic political culture among boththe governing elite and the governed alike. For this reason, the state organization should berestructured in accordance with the requirement of the superiority of the elected. Within thesechanges, civil-military relations should be reviewed and democratic understanding should begiven priority. In this direction, based on a liberal worldview, an entirely civilian, liberal anddemocratic constitution should be prepared which is based on not the state but individual andfree from official ideology and tutelage spirit. YAŞ must be handed as a consultative body andthe partial judicial oversight which was introduced for YAŞ decisions with 2010 constitutionalamendments must be expanded and it must be ensured that none of the decisions are protectedfrom supervision. All decisions which have political nature in the military field should be takenby the Ministry of National Defense and the government. MGK which serves more like apolitical decision body today must be deprived of its constitutional status and its effectiveness ininternal political issues must be terminated; the body should be reorganized as a consultativebody which only deals with external threats. Provisions in new law should envisage serioussanctions against any activity, declaration, attitude and behavior which could implicate military intervention in politics.
  • The efforts to increase civilian control are not independent from the conflict in the nature ofcivil-military relations issue. On one hand, the military must be strong enough to survive thewars of the society. The features of an ideal army can be obtained from this principle:responsible for defending the political structure, prepared for emergencies and, when necessary,less important problems, properly guided for the threats that the political structure of the societycan encounter and adequately powerful. On the other hand, although the army has to protect thesystem from its enemies, it has to perform its activities so that it will not terminate the societythat it is supposed to protect. The army should have coercive power to impose its will on othersas it will face enemies. Therefore, a traditional concern of civilian-military relations is the direct assume of political power by the military (Feaver, 1996: 151-152).
  • The main theme in civilian-military relations is to create an army which is both able to performeverything that the civilians need but which will perform only the things that civilians authorizeby reconciling these two features (Feaver, 1996: 149). Accordingly, it can be claimed thatcivilian-military relations can assume a healthy structure if this conflict in the nature of the topicis overcome. Effective and efficient civilian-military relations allow for democratic societies tocreate the balance needed for the coexistence of an army powerful enough to fight wars and afree society powerful enough to organize its own affairs at the same time (Burk, 1993: 462).
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  • Finer, S. E. (1975). The Man on Horseback: Military Intervention into Politics. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
  • Gruber, J. E. (1987). Controlling Bureaucracies: Dilemmas in Democratic Governance. USA: University of California Press.
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  • https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k6771.html (06.04.2017).
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  • Huntington, S. P. (1996). Reforming Civil-Military Relations. Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, No. 4 (February 1996)
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  • Kardaş, Ü. (2006). Askeri Gücün Anayasal bir Yargı Alanı Yaratması ve Yürütme Erkini Etkinbir Şekilde Kullanması. in A. Bayramoğlu and Ali İnsel (Eds.), Bir Zümre Bir Parti: Türkiye’de Ordu. Istanbul: Birikim Publications.
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  • Meier, K. J. and O’Toole, L. J. (2006). Bureaucracy in a democratic state: A governance perspective. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
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  • i Keegan claims that a Roman captain, Ligustinus, manifested the first example of professionalsoldier: “The officer corps represented by consisted of people who accepted military as aprofession, did not consider entering into politics, whose purpose was to progress in militarycareer and for the first time in history military emerged as a self-sufficing profession.” Keegan, 2011; Keppie, 2002: 17.
  • ii Gulick (1937: 192-3) argued that we had to make concessions from pure efficiencyunderstanding in the light off political values and social order. For example, we had citizenboards and small local governments which were rather inefficient, but they could be verybeneficial in democracies as educative tools.” Likewise, Dahl claimed that in a democraticsociety there were criteria other than functions efficiency (Dahl, 1947: 61). For example, Naziconcentration camps were operated very efficiently during the Second World War; but thesame cannot be said in terms of the values other than efficiency which the public bodiesshould observe (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2007: 11). On the other hand, Walker claimed thatthe purpose of administration was to obtain maximum benefit by making minimum use of theresources of the society by remaining within the framework envisaged by laws (Dahl, 1947). iii See http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/5982.htm (24.12.2014).
  • iv See T.C.Prime Ministry, 2013: 57.
  • v See T.C.Prime Ministry, 2013: 45-46.
  • vii For the act no. 4963 on harmonization package see 07. 08. 2003 dated and 25192 numberedOfficial Gazette at http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2007/04/20070403-16.htmviii Indeed, all secretaries general of MGK assigned after the amendment were civilians(Mehmet Yiğit Alpogan, ambassador 01.10.2004-16.07.2007, Tahsin Burcuoğlu, ambassador01.11.2007-25.01.2010, Serdar Kılıç, ambassador 01.04.2010-26.04.2012, Muammer Türker,governor 27.04.2012- 25.09.2014), seeix For the cancelled legislation, see Docket no. 2009/52, Decision no. 2010/5 (suspension ofexecution), Decision date: 21.1.2010, see http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2010/01/20100127-8.htm (25.12.2014).
  • x On 28 February 1997, the National Security Council convened and aired a declaration whichcalled for the stepping-down of the government due to its “radical Islamist” tendencies whichput the core values of the Republic in jeopardy, an action termed as "post modern coup" in and outside Turkey (Yildirim, 2018: 106).
  • xi See T.C.Prime Ministry, 2013: 60.
  • xii See http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982ay.htm (25.12.2014).xiii For the mentioned deficiencies see http://www.yaszedeler.org/ (17.09.2015).
  • xiv Decree Law no. 668, see http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/07/20160727M2..htm xv See http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/11/20161124-3..htm (30.01.2017).
  • xvi Decree Law no. 671, see http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler//2016/08/20160817- 18..htm (07.04.2017).
  • xvii The Higher Military Council is composed of civilian and military members of the GeneralStaff. It is given the task of providing opinion on the military strategic concept and, whenevernecessary, its revision, which is prepared by the Gnereal Chief of Staff. It also provides opinionon the main program and objectives of the armed forces as well as all the regulationsconcerning the armed forces. See. www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.1612.doc (06.09.2018)
  • xviii Law no. 6756, see http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/11/20161124-3..htm xix See https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k6771.html (06.04.2017).
  • xx See https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k6771.html (06.04.2017).
  • xxi Former Chief of General Staff, Işık Koşaner commented: “They say that remove the 35tharticle and replace it with this or that. Replace it or not, we, as the Armed Forces, are there forthat reason. This is our historical duty. Nobody can say the opposite to us.” See Bugünnewspaper, Second Act in Işık Koşaner Confessions, 26.08.2011, see
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